Private equity: Candover and out
Thu, 02 Sep 2010 10:46:15 GMT

A once-revered buy-out firm is going under. Who’s next?

FOR years people have been predicting the demise of private equity. Now they have a proper tombstone to point at. On August 31st Candover, once one of Britain’s leading private-equity firms, announced that it would unwind its assets and return money to shareholders and investors. The 30-year-old firm is the biggest buy-out victim of the crisis so far.

Bad investments during the boom helped undo Candover. Several companies in its portfolio have struggled under their debts over the past two years, including Ferretti, a luxury-yacht maker. In June Candover relinquished control of Gala Coral, a gambling company, to creditors. It has had to write down several other investments. ...

Carbon markets: The smoking greenhouse gun
Thu, 02 Sep 2010 10:46:15 GMT

An alluring trade in “supergreenhouse” gas emissions is coming under scrutiny

ONE of the curiosities of carbon markets is that they do not just trade in carbon. Other greenhouse gases can be given a value, too—sometimes a very high one. Claims that these prices promote scammery are now prompting some searching questions.

The gas at the centre of the controversy is HFC-23, a greenhouse gas which, on a weight-for-weight basis, is 14,800 times better at trapping heat than carbon dioxide. HFC-23 is produced as a by-product of the manufacture of HCFC-22, an ozone-destroying refrigerant. HCFC-22 is banned in developed countries, but developing countries can keep making it until 2030. ...

Economics focus: War footing
Thu, 02 Sep 2010 10:46:15 GMT

Monetary and fiscal stimulus make a potent, if uneasy, combination

THE Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s annual conference in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, is the big event of the year for central bankers. But defining monetary policy is far harder than it used to be. In recent years central bankers have lurched ever closer to the realm of fiscal policy, mainly by buying government debt with freshly printed money. They can justify such “quantitative easing” (QE) on monetary grounds since they have already lowered short-term interest rates to, or close to, zero. But they also worry it is a slippery slope from QE to monetising government deficits and thence, inevitably, to inflation. When Phillip Swagel, then an official with the US Treasury, was asked why he attended the conference in 2008, he shrugged: “Fiscal policy, monetary policy—what’s the difference?”

For central bankers this is an unsettling thought. Their mistrust of fiscal policy was nicely captured in a paper presented at this year’s Jackson Hole conference by Eric Leeper of Indiana University*. As central bankers have become more independent, they have increasingly based their policies on rigorous economic analysis. By contrast fiscal policy is deeply politicised, with haphazard methods and few, if any, defined goals. ...

Buttonwood: Divvying up returns
Thu, 02 Sep 2010 10:46:15 GMT

Investors should pay more attention to dividends

DIVIDENDS do not get the respect they deserve. Over the long run they provide the bulk of equity investors’ returns. Work by Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh and Mike Staunton of the London Business School* found that over the period from 1900 to 2005, the real return from global equities averaged 5%. The mean dividend yield over that period was 4.5%.

Despite this, stockmarkets devote a lot more time to forecasting and analysing profits than they do to thinking about payouts. Profits can be easily manipulated and come in a bewildering variety of forms (operating, reported, post-tax, pre-exceptional, etc). Dividends are (mostly) paid in cash and so are hard to fake. ...

Finance after the crisis: Deutsche Bank: A tamer casino
Thu, 02 Sep 2010 10:46:15 GMT

Germany’s biggest bank is trying to make investment banking boring. The latest in our series of profiles of financial institutions after the crisis

JOSEF ACKERMANN, the head of Deutsche Bank, combines a silky manner with blunt words. When the German government set up a bail-out fund to stabilise the country’s banking system, he said he would be “ashamed” to use it. When Europe and the IMF bailed out Greece, Mr Ackermann said he doubted it would pay back the loans. And when regulators and economists say that big banks should be broken up, with “casino” investment banks split off from “utility” retail banks, Mr Ackermann retorts that “smaller banks will not make us safer.”

Mr Ackermann speaks with the authority of a man who steered his bank through the crisis more deftly than most. Deutsche did not escape unscathed. In 2008, a year in which it had confidently forecast a record profit of more than €8 billion ($11.7 billion), it posted a net loss of almost €4 billion because of a huge hit to its investment bank (see chart). Yet it emerged from the crisis as the leading member of an exclusive club of large banks—others include Barclays and Credit Suisse—that did not have to take direct injections of public funds (although all, of course, benefited from a wide range of other government props to the system). ...

The world economy: The odd decouple
Thu, 02 Sep 2010 10:46:15 GMT

Theories about why some rich-world economies are doing better than America’s don’t stand up

AMERICA is used to making the economic weather. It has the world’s largest economy, its most influential central bank and it issues the main global reserve currency. In recent months, however, some rich-world economies (notably Germany’s) have basked in the sunshine even as the clouds gathered over America.

On August 27th America’s second-quarter GDP growth was revised down to an annualised 1.6%. That looked moribund compared with the 9% rate confirmed in Germany a few days earlier. America’s jobless rate was 9.5% in July (figures for August were released on September 3rd, after The Economist went to press). But in Germany the unemployment rate is lower even than before the downturn. Other rich countries, including Britain and Australia, have enjoyed sprightlier recent GDP growth and lower unemployment than America. ...

Sovereign debt: Wiggle room
Thu, 02 Sep 2010 10:46:15 GMT

The IMF offers indebted governments some reassurance

ONE consequence of the deepest recession since the Depression has been the biggest peacetime build-up of public debt the rich world has ever seen. Some reckon that the debt position of many rich countries is now unsustainable. It is a measure of just how nervous people have become about the mountain of debt that the IMF—not usually known for taking doveish views—concluded in two papers released on September 1st that there is too much pessimism about public finances.

The IMF argues that despite historically high debt-to-GDP ratios, many countries still have room for fiscal manoeuvre. Typically, the debate on the point at which a country’s debt burden spirals out of control has tried to identify a single debt-to-GDP threshold, above which things are no longer sustainable. The fund’s economists argue that a universal debt limit does not make sense. ...

Economics focus: Bad circulation
Thu, 26 Aug 2010 10:50:43 GMT

There is more to America’s stubbornly high unemployment rate than just weak demand

AMERICANS are used to thinking of their job market as lithe and supple. Employment snaps back quickly after recessions. Workers routinely shuttle between industries and cities to wherever jobs are abundant. But in the past decade, the labour market has resembled an ageing athlete. Each new injury is more painful and takes longer to heal. More than a year into the current economic recovery the unemployment rate remains stuck close to 10%, raising concerns about the kind of sclerosis that continental Europe suffered in the 1980s.

The slow rehabilitation is in part because the economy suffered a trauma, not a scrape. The fall in GDP during the last recession was easily the largest of the post-war period, and output remains well below its potential. Few had expected a rapid return to full employment, but even modest expectations for jobs growth have not been met. Employment has actually fallen since the end of the recession; and unemployment would be even higher than it is were it not for discouraged would-be jobseekers quitting the workforce. Some economists now fret that other barriers besides weak demand stand between workers and jobs, and that high unemployment is partly “structural” in nature. ...

Finance after the crisis: Pactual: The origins of a new species
Thu, 26 Aug 2010 10:50:43 GMT

The latest of our profiles of financial firms after the crisis looks at BTG Pactual, Brazil’s investment-banking powerhouse

IN RECENT years investment banks were supposedly hijacked by boffins who used their nuclear-physics doctorates to devastating effect. Yet the industry has long been slave to a different tribe of scientists: the bulge-bracket Darwinists. They reckon only giant global firms can survive.

Until last year, Pactual, a Brazilian outfit, had conformed to their doctrine. In 2006 it sold out to a big foreign firm, UBS, for $3.1 billion, making its partners some of Brazil’s richest men. But then in 2009 the Swiss bank, reeling from losses, unexpectedly sold Pactual back to BTG, a local investment fund co-founded by Andre Esteves, one of the bank’s former top brass, for $2.5 billion. Today the renamed BTG Pactual is owned again by its partners and led by Mr Esteves who has a 25-30% stake. ...

Emerging-market debt: A run for your money
Thu, 26 Aug 2010 10:50:43 GMT

Developing countries in Latin America and Asia can borrow for longer

PERU is not an obvious investment darling. For much of its existence, the country has been in a state of default. As recently as 1990 the inflation rate was 7,500%. Yet in the past few years Peru has persuaded creditors to lend it money for ever-longer periods in its own currency. It issued its first 20-year local-currency bond in 2006; its debut 30-year bonds followed a year later. Earlier this year Peru was able to issue 300m soles ($105.2m) of 32-year local-currency bonds. Investors in these bonds are compensated for the risk of inflation by yields of just 6.9%, a once unthinkable prospect.

Peru is not alone. Anxious to wean themselves off flighty foreign funding after the crises of the 1990s, many emerging-market governments sought to build up local-currency bond issuance. Extending the maturity of bonds is the next step. In 2007 around 40% of Peru’s local-currency debt was short-term (ie, maturing in less than a year). That had fallen to 30% by 2009, according to the Bank for International Settlements. In Mexico average maturities have gone from 1.5 years in 2000 to seven years a decade later, says Gerardo Rodriguez, who heads the country’s debt office. ...

European banks: A glow from the east
Thu, 26 Aug 2010 10:50:43 GMT

A slow fuse still burns on eastern Europe’s foreign-currency debts

AFTER firefighters extinguish a blaze they usually look carefully for glowing embers before rolling up their hoses and heading off. With the worst of the banking crisis now receding in most rich countries, it is tempting to send the financial firefighters home. But wafts of smoke from eastern Europe suggest the job of stabilising Europe’s banking system is not yet done.

In early August a number of banks operating in the region reported sometimes startling rises in loan losses. Among them were UniCredit, Erste Group and OTP. It had been hoped that loan losses would start falling. Instead they have continued to climb—alarmingly in some cases. In Kazakhstan more than a third of outstanding debt is non-performing. In Latvia, almost a fifth of debt is going bad. ...

Bank capital: Foundations of jelly
Thu, 26 Aug 2010 10:50:43 GMT

A lawsuit in Germany highlights the flaws of hybrid securities

“MORE capital, better capital” has been the chant of central bankers and regulators, as they strive to rebuild the banking system on more solid foundations. The debate about how much capital banks should hold against unexpected losses has captured much attention. But a lawsuit in Germany raises equally pressing questions about the sorts of capital banks hold.

The thinking behind the regulatory push for simplicity and solidity is that over the past few decades banks have been allowed to build complex capital structures made from inferior materials. The best sort of capital to ensure a stable banking system is equity, because it directly absorbs losses and can thus cushion against systemic shocks. It is, however, expensive, so banks have sought to dilute it with cheap fillers, such as the delightfully-named “hybrid capital” and other fancy instruments. One reason for their popularity with the banks that issued them was that they paid fixed interest, which was tax-deductible. Regulators, for their part, took comfort from the fact that hybrids were a bit like equity in that payments could be stopped to preserve capital should a bank run into trouble. ...

ShoreBank: Small enough to fail
Thu, 26 Aug 2010 10:50:43 GMT

The sorry end to a bold banking experiment

“LET’S change the world”: ShoreBank’s slogan shouted that the Chicago-based lender saw itself as not just a bank but the leader of a movement. Founded in 1973, it set out to prove that money could be lent profitably to poor people in poor neighbourhoods. For 35 years it thrived but the financial storm that hit in 2008, and the economic downturn that followed, proved its undoing. On August 20th the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the bank’s regulator, called time on its experiment in what became known as community-development finance.

Like many financial institutions, ShoreBank was hit hard by America’s housing bust. Yet in the first few months after the house-price bubble burst, Ron Grzywinski, a founder of the bank, was able to contrast the low default rates on ShoreBank’s mortgages with the higher ones of less responsible subprime lenders, such as Countrywide. The difference, he argued, was that ShoreBank did it the “old-fashioned way”—getting to know the borrower and securing a significant down payment against a realistically-valued property. ...

HSBC and Nedbank: Mutual attraction
Thu, 26 Aug 2010 10:50:43 GMT

HSBC learns to play the vuvuzela

THE closest HSBC traditionally got to sub-Saharan Africa was sending its Hong Kong-bound staff round the Cape of Good Hope before the Suez Canal opened in 1869. It is a sign of the region’s vastly improved prospects and the bank’s evolving strategy that HSBC is now in talks to buy a controlling stake in Nedbank, one of South Africa’s big four banks, with a market value of $9 billion.

As Africa gets richer and does more trade with Asia, foreign banks are becoming more interested. That was the logic cited in 2007 when China Development Bank bought a stake in Barclays, which owns a big African business, and a few months later when ICBC, China’s biggest bank, bought a 20% stake in Standard Bank, South Africa’s largest, which has operations in some neighbouring countries. Citigroup and Standard Chartered, which along with Barclays have the biggest pan-African networks, now talk more about their prospects there. Portugal’s banks, which dominate in Angola and Mozambique, view their operations there as jewels. ...

Hedge funds: Bigger, safer but duller
Thu, 26 Aug 2010 10:50:43 GMT

A secretive industry opens up to meet the demands of investors and regulators

FOR much of the past two years hedge-fund managers have tried to convince queasy investors not to give up on them. Now it seems that some of the industry’s biggest names have given up on themselves. Stanley Druckenmiller, a celebrated hedge-fund manager and protege of George Soros, announced on August 18th that he would close his fund, Duquesne Capital Management, because he was “dissatisfied” with its performance. Two days later it emerged that another well-known manager, Paolo Pellegrini, plans to hand back investors their remaining money by the end of September, after making losses.

Messrs Druckenmiller and Pellegrini are not the only hedge-fund managers to have been humbled. Hedge funds used to boast of their ability to deliver “absolute returns”—to make money regardless of the ups and downs in financial markets. That illusion was shattered in 2008 when the funds’ average returns were -19%, according to data from Hedge Fund Research, which tracks the industry. Funds clawed back some of the losses last year but have struggled to build on that recovery. Returns were -0.2% in the first half of 2010 (although stockmarkets fell by much more). Capital losses and withdrawals by investors have left hedge-fund assets at around $1.6 trillion, down from a 2007 peak of almost $1.9 trillion (see chart). ...

Chinese banks: Circular logic
Thu, 19 Aug 2010 11:47:28 GMT

Chinese banks are undergoing an odd kind of bail-out

THE banks of China did their duty by supporting the government’s stimulus efforts last year. Lending soared by a frenetic 32% in 2009; growth has slowed this year, but remains a robust 18%. Now the government is standing by the banks.

A flurry of reports in the local Chinese press predicts that on August 24th Huijin, a branch of China Investment Corporation (CIC), the country’s sovereign-wealth fund and the holder of big stakes in all of its main banks, will issue the first of a series of bonds. Up to 187.5 billion yuan ($28 billion) should be raised in short order, with much of the demand coming from China’s state-controlled companies. These funds are expected to be used to support rights offerings by the big Chinese banks later in the year, as they seek to maintain capital ratios and protect against an expected wave of dud loans. ...

Economics focus: Paper chains
Thu, 19 Aug 2010 11:47:28 GMT

Tight policies in surplus countries helped undo the gold standard, which is a lesson for the euro

CHRIS ROCK, a comedian, is a big fan of Oprah Winfrey, a television host and philanthropist. He recalls one of Ms Winfrey’s shows during which a woman confessed to her husband that she had frittered away $300,000 and as a consequence their home was about to be repossessed. “By the end of the show, it was all the guy’s fault,” a clearly impressed Mr Rock told David Letterman, another talk-show host. “He was apologising for not loving her enough—it was the greatest ‘Oprah’ of all time.”

This may seem an odd sort of blame-shifting. Yet reasoning of this kind is increasingly used to explain how spendthrift countries get into trouble. On this view America’s credit boom and bust owed as much to a savings glut in Asia as to laxity at home. A new paper* by Barry Eichengreen of the University of California, Berkeley, and Peter Temin of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, adds a dash of subtlety and a generous slice of history to this sort of analysis. The authors examine the role of fixed exchange rates in booms and busts and draw parallels between the inter-war gold standard and contemporary schemes, such as the euro and China’s peg with the dollar. ...

Government bonds: A bull market in pessimism
Thu, 19 Aug 2010 11:47:28 GMT

A lot has to go wrong to justify today’s rock-bottom bond yields

WHEN Japan slid into deflation in the mid-1990s bond investors were caught unawares. As late as 1995 yields on government bonds, a haven in times of deflation, were still approaching 5%. Investors today are not about to repeat that mistake. Inflation may be positive in America, Britain and Germany, but in all three countries government-bond yields have plunged to lows exceeded in recent times only by levels during the 2008 panic.

Since falling yields raise the value of bond principal, that has delivered bumper returns to investors. Government bonds have returned about 8% this year in local-currency terms in these three countries, according to Barclays Capital, outpacing equity returns. (Investors in weaker sovereign credits, such as Greece, have fared far worse). As go returns, so go investors. American equity mutual funds have seen net outflows this year of $7 billion, according to the Investment Company Institute, a trade group. Bond funds have had inflows of $191 billion. ...